Colombia's oil history began in 1918 and reached its golden era at the end of the 1980s. The important discoveries made during those years led Colombia to an expenditure spiral, paired with a huge fiscal deficit and a high public debt, drastically changing a seven decade long record of fiscal stability. The era of cheap and easy oil is coming to an end and, although exploration contracts and investment have increased, no important discoveries have been.
The evolution of oil industry in Colombia
Oil history in Colombia is tightly linked to the shifts in the different factors that regulate this activity around the world. Variations in the oil price, set forth by both geopolitical factors and imbalances between supply and demand, determine the levels of investment and, hence, affect the amount of exploration activity. The era of cheap and easy oil is coming to an end. Since were found, for an accumulated total of 4,182 MMBO (see Figure 1 ). Towards the end of this period the state owned company, Ecopetrol was founded (1951) , as a result of the reversion of La Cira -Infantas concession, operated by an Exxon affiliate.
-1994: this was a period marked by nationalism and deregulation, when a new
Association Contracts was designed (1974) ; the state-take was increased under several consecutive contractual schemes, leading to an almost complete loss of competitiveness for the contract. This period was related to a number of important reserve discoveries (over 500 MMBO per field), and intensive exploratory activity. The discovery of giant fields such as Chuchupa (1973 ), Caño Limón (1983 , Cusiana (1988) and Cupiagua (1993) , placed Colombia in the spotlight for the most important oil multinationals, despite the unfavorable contractual terms.
Thereby a significant increase in exploratory activity took place. During this period 5,169 MMBO of reserves were discovered, and fresh capital and technology became key contributions of foreign investors. 12.000 1918 1922 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 Cira / Infantas. 
-2008: this period witnessed modifications of oil regulation and a recovery of exploration.
The hydrocarbons sector was restructured and the National Hydrocarbons Agency was created (2003) . New contracting mechanisms were developed and the State-take reduced, creating favorable conditions to increase investment. Small companies and independent investors played a crucial role in exploratory activity in the country, particularly in the later years, as a result of high oil prices. Along these years 631 MMBO were discovered, mainly in small fields and particularly in the eastern plains basin (Los Llanos). The number and size of discoveries got smaller since 1993, with yearly discoveries lower than 100 and even to 50 MMBO, recently. The most important discovery in this period was the Guando field (2000), discovered by Petrobrás, with reserves close to 100 MMBO.
Capital for exploration investment and technology ceased to an exclusive asset of large companies. Service companies started to provide technology and participate in exploratory and development projects, also becoming operators. Reserves discovered in Colombia along these 90 years reach 9,982 MMBO, and remaining reserves amount to 1,359 MMBO at year end 2007. The country has been permanently concerned with increasing the resource base and maintaining output level, so as to keep the character of oil exporting country.
Oil reserves and production over the past 8 years are illustrated in Figure 2 . Over the past four years the average annual production levels have been maintained, efficiently confronting their natural decline, through aggressive programs to optimize mature fields production, mainly by Ecopetrol and its partners. However, during this period reserve replacement has been insufficient for maintaining the levels present at the beginning of the decade. This, in conjunction with the deficit created over the previous years, generates a worrying imbalance. 1922 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 Wells drilled Reserves (MMBOE)
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Drilled oil wells Source: Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos Ecopetrol could carry out the activities on its own or through association contracts. Figure 4 shows that before the big oil wells, Caño Limón, Cusiana and Copiagua were discovered in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Colombia's oil production reached its peak in 1970 when 226,000 barrels were produced each day. In 1980, the production had fallen to 131,000 barrels per day. Barrios (2003) attributes the fall in production to the decrease in the exploration activity generated by the association contract of 1974, which restricted significantly multinational companies' participation.
Vicissitudes of oil contracts' regulation
During the 1970s and 1980s exploration was based mainly at the eastern side of the country, in 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 Source: British Petroleum
The association contract, period 1974 -2007 The association contract in Colombia worked as a joint venture between Ecopetrol and the foreign company. The company assumed 100% of the exploration risk and costs and Ecopetrol shared past and future costs, once the field was declared commercial. Colombia's fiscal terms in the oil sector have changed several times, changing the rules and participation rate of the association contract. The subsequent association contracts can be divided into four separate types, and are described in Figure 5 and Table 1 . In 2004, there were some changes in the contract that will be discussed later on, however, the main characteristics of type D contracts remain, and therefore are not separated in Figure 5 and Table 1 .
Type A contract: 50-50 (1970-1989) This contract was created in 1969, but came into practice in 1974. The foreign partner was in charge of the exploration stage and had to pay the totality of the investment and assumed all the risks. This first stage lasted 6 years and was followed by 22 years for exploitation. After a commercial discovery was been made, the foreign partner paid 20% in royalties from the hydrocarbons produced. From that moment on, both Ecopetrol and the multinational company had 50% participation over the field's production and shared, in equal parts, the investments made. Ecopetrol didn't participate in the production share until 50% (in current prices) of the exploration costs were covered. If the partner made a discovery without Ecopetrol's investment, once the 20% royalties were paid, the private company could take the totality of the production of that well until 200% of the perforation costs were covered. Afterwards, production was split in the usual way.
Figure 5. Thirty years regulating oil production-distribution in Colombia
According to Barrios (2003) , after the gigantic oil well was found in Cusiana, Ecopetrol realized that the existing association contract did not distribute the production according to the size of the field. This is why, in 1990, the government introduced the "Sliding scale association contract", in which the State owned company participation increased as production grew. This is known as the Type B contract.
Type B contract: sliding scale distribution (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) Type B contracts worked similarly lo type A contracts in terms of duration and exploration obligations. Once the 20% royalties were paid, production was distributed in the same way as before (50%-50%). However, when production surpassed 60 million barrels, the state's company participation increased. Table 2 shows the participation rates according to the well's production. This contract included new clauses which aimed at transferring technological knowledge to Ecopetrol and improving the environmental control. In 1994 a new contract was introduced. In this contract, Ecopetrol's participation rate increased not as a function of production, but as a function of the profitability of the project. 1970-1989 1990-1994 1994-1999 2000-2008 [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] According to Barrios (2003) , type C contracts were born with the intention of taking into account the profitability of the projects. It not only included the total production, but also prices and costs. The author says that the so called "R factor" was introduced as a way to generate a fairer distribution of the profits between Ecopetrol and the foreign company. Therefore, once again, the participation rate increased when the production surpassed 60 million barrels; however, the rate depended on the company's revenues and costs, according to the R factor. The R factor is defined as follows:
Where:
AR: Associate's accumulated revenues (volume x price)
ID: Accumulated investment GO: Accumulated operational costs
A: Direct exploration costs financed entirely by the associate B: Accumulated costs' refund Under this type of contract, the costs refund had to be paid in constant prices, taking into account the international inflation rate. Since 1995, refunds included dry wells' costs and seismic works. As Figure 5 shows, in October 1997 a change was made in the R factor for gas production.
Before 1997, the R factor was the same for both liquid and gas hydrocarbons discoveries. In
October 1997, a change was introduced in the contract, in case gas was found. There were two main variations: first, the duration of the contract increased. A four year retention period was introduced after the six year exploration period ended and, the exploitation period was extended up to thirty years; therefore, the contract could last 40 years. On the other hand, a different distribution scheme was established. In this case, the R factor worked as shown in Table 4 .
However, according to Barrios (2003) , Colombian fiscal terms for multinational oil companies were still not competitive enough, and thus, the association contract was once again modified in 1999. Type D contract: R factor 30%-70% (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) The main change made in 1999 was the decrease in Ecopetrol's take; it was lowered from 50% to 30%. In that way, the R factor applied also changed, accelerating the private investor's cost recovery. When production was less than 60 million oil barrels, the associate's take (after royalties) will be 70%. Table 5 shows the production distribution after the 60 million barrels limit is surpassed. Source: Barrios (2003) As Figure 5 and Table 1 show, type D contracts also changed the way royalties were paid. The private investor no longer had to pay a constant 20% of royalties, but instead these depend on production. If less than 5 thousand barrels of oil are produced daily, the associate has to pay 5%. Royalties increase in a straight line up to 125 thousand barrels, reaching 20%. Between 125 thousand daily barrels and 400 thousand, royalties remain constant at 20%. From 400 thousand to 600 thousand daily barrels, royalties increase up to the upper limit, 25%. In 2004, the contract was modified and royalties started from 8%. Figure 6 shows the way current royalties are paid.
In 2003, the government separated the regulatory and the entrepreneurial responsibilities of Ecopetrol. The former were assigned to the Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos (ANH), whose board is composed of the ministers of mining, finance and planning, with two more members appointed by the president. This agency is also responsible for administering the oil resources of the nation. In February 2004, the ANH announced a new type of contract in which the participation of Ecopetrol will not be mandatory in the areas available to new investors.
Previously, the private investor was responsible for the whole exploration assigned areas, and
Ecopetrol joined only in successful ones. Besides, Ecopetrol also pursued its own areas with modest success.
Furthermore, under the new contract, one hundred percent of the oil can be extracted by the investor, modifying the 1999-2003 scheme. Royalties and taxes will depend on the development of the successful fields. Although these measures seem to fulfill international requests, potential investors are still unsure about the guarantee that they will be able to keep the fields until depletion, or that new conditions (taxes and government participation) would not be imposed above those agreed upon. Indeed, the unstable regulation of the nineties is a revealing and troubling signal that this could happen. This new arrangement, called "modern concession contract", will specify a timetable for exploration and exploitation for the private investors in every field, and will be monitored by the ANH. The agency can terminate the concession if this "best efforts" commitment is not fulfilled by the company. Still, even if potential investors are attracted, the security factor will gravitate around any exploration in Colombia, and it is likely to affect potential exploitation in the future.
The government is doing its best in this front also, aiming to consolidate the firms already in the country, and to attract new ones. What about Ecopetrol? It will compete for prospects with other companies, apparently on equal standing. This led, in 2007, to the public capitalization of Ecopetrol.
In July 2007, the ANH introduced the Colombian rounds system. The Agency decides on a specific area and sells the right to explore and exploit it through an auction process. According to the ANH, the private investor is obliged to execute the Minimum Exploratory Work offered during the bidding process and has to develop the terms of the contract assuming all the costs and risks. The company owns the production rights net of royalties, which are paid according to the terms specified in type D contracts ( Figure 5 ). In the bidding process, companies offer the ANH a participation of the production, and a high price participation, which is due if international prices exceed a pre-established level. Notice that this new scheme increases again the state take, via a bidding process. 1905 1911 1917 1923 1929 1935 1941 1947 1953 1959 1965 1971 1977 1983 1989 1995 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 Source: Junguito and Rincon 2004 and Ministry of Finance
The effects of changes in the fiscal terms
In fact, Colombia´s austere management of public finances and its capacity to quickly correct mistakes had made it stand out among Latin American countries during the previous two decades. This is why the events after 1995 are so notorious. To point out the difficulty to interpret Colombia's recent past, it is useful to start out by enumerating some of the most outstanding phenomena which could be related to the fiscal reversal of fortune illustrated in Figure 9 .
• Substantial oil discoveries between 1983 and 1994 (ca. 3 billion barrels in new reserves)
• New Constitution enacted, created the constitutional court and enhanced justices' role on granting rights to citizens, with fiscal impact; Central Bank independence; deepening of decentralization in health and education sectors, granting sub-national governments a share on nation's tax revenues
• Emergence of the public pension liability, hitherto hidden in the balance sheet of several decentralized social security institutions, which first became explicit during the nineties
• Cocaine export boom, with effects on the economy, society and institutions
• Internal conflict with guerrillas and paramilitaries intensified, due to their financing with kidnappings, drug trafficking and local corruption
• Economic openness in a globalization environment
• Bubble and bust of mortgage debt and housing prices.
• Health and education reform demanded large fresh resources, many of which used to increase teacher's salaries and for excessive labor contracts and privileges in public hospitals Although is difficult to prioritize the list of factors presented, we will maintain that the positive oil shock, represented in the substantial increase of reserves, was the single most influential event of the past decade, partially causing the fiscal misfortunes documented. This implies that the oil boom wasn't managed in the most appropriate way. Such handling can hardly be exclusively ascribed to a specific group of policy makers, such as mines ministers, Ecopetrol's CEOs or the central government economic team. Although some responsibility can be attributed to them, the orientation given to the new resources was derived from political decisions made by the society at large.
In fact, Figure 9 raises the question: why would a society that for ninety years had revealed a preference for stability and for moderate fluctuations in its fiscal balances and public debt, decide to change drastically its choice? This happened at the beginning of the 90s and was reinforced along the decade.
Many observers have pointed out the 1991 Constitution as a single cause behind the shift in fiscal stance. The reason alleged is the decentralized education and health outlays mandated by it. We believe that the constitution was the vehicle, the "how" of the process. But what must be explained is the "why". The question could be asked in the following way: why would a society who had watched carefully that the legal commitments of the public budget did not exceed systematically the tax resources, contributions and estate-owned companies' surpluses, decide to assign to the national government budget an expenditure burden superior to its long term resources? What can justify this odd behavior, precisely in the country that had stood up in Latin America for its fiscal neutrality? Did the Colombian ruling class suddenly become irresponsible and created a constitution and legislation too generous along the 90s? These questions have not been raised, at least to our knowledge.
It must be taken into account that the consumption madness not only infected the central government, departments and municipalities, but also Colombian firms and households. The proof lies in the associated crisis in the business sector due to the acquired debts, in dollars and pesos, along the decade (Echeverry et al. 2003) , and the mortgage crisis that troubled the Colombian households and destroyed the UPAC system.
The euphoric consumption behavior invaded governments, firms and households. Once again, what phenomenon induced traditionally moderate governments, firms and households to shift excessively their expenditure patterns?
It has been argued that the drug trafficking inflows or that the incidence of the guerrillas and the armed conflict can explain the events of the 90s. Naturally, part of the explanation lies on these facts, but is hard to believe that Colombian households and firms decided to spend systematically above their incomes as kidnappings, guerrilla attacks and drug trafficking increased. On the contrary, these events would normally alert a society. In the Colombian case, these events took place at the same time as the society let down their guard while it weakened institutionally and economically.
The principal cause, in our opinion, is the massive inflows from oil resources derived from the discoveries made in the 80s and at the beginning of the 90s. To these, revenues from drug trafficking and a brief international capital boom can be added.
Why, can the excessive expenditure in the 90s be attributed to a greater extent to oil than to capital inflows and drug trafficking income? The reason is that the shift towards an aggressive expenditure state policy can only be attributed to the first one. In fact, from the three events mentioned, oil had the biggest impact on public revenue. Capital inflows increased government revenue through privatizations, which were relatively small and illegal dollars' inflows normally don't pay taxes.
Nevertheless, capital inflows and drug trafficking dollars are partly responsible for the real peso appreciation of the 90s. There is no doubt that the strong peso played a key role in the expenditure boom of the private sector. This was the case for households and firms. To complete the picture, the real appreciation received an additional impulse from the deteriorating public finances and the government financing needs.
Summing up, the most significant shocks were the relaxation of the state budget constrain derived from oil revenues and the real peso appreciation. The transmission channels were: 1) the commitments acquired in the justice department and transfers to regions laid on the new constitution; 2) generosity towards teachers who perceived several raises between 1995 and 1998; 3) increase in government spending through the funds known as Fondos de Cofinanciación; 4) substantial increase in regional governments' expenditures derived from the central government's transfers and access to the financial markets; 5) transmission channels in the private sector were the increase in incomes resulting from the economic boom in the first half of the decade, the real peso appreciation, which increased household's purchasing power and a greater access to credit (mortgage and consumption).
The consequences were high state indebtedness, at all governmental levels and the private sector indebtedness, in households and firms. This high degree of financial leverage made the society vulnerable to the shocks that came later on.
The negative shocks that afflicted the Colombian economy at the end of the 90s came both from the internal and external front. In the first case, the political crisis led by the judgment of the President by the Parliament and the worsening of the violence situation in the hands of the FARC and the paramilitaries.
In the external front there were considerable shocks, represented by devaluation and increased spreads of several emerging economies. It began with Mexico in 1994 and Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Ecuador and Argentina followed soon after. This countrycrisis led to a recessive cycle in Latin America, which reached its bottom in 1999, Colombian economy was subject to it (See Figure 10) . 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Latin America Colombia Source: DANE and ECLAC
Another part of the analysis deserves attention: the Central Bank has been accused of focusing too much on inflation, leaving behind their responsibility on smoothing economic and labor market cycles. In fact, the constitution gave the Bank a specific role and the bank interpreted it in a more severe way. A 1999 Constitutional Court sentence illustrated this when the monetary authority was reminded that it should pay attention to labor fluctuations as well. There's no doubt and, has been documented, that long term, low and stable inflation is desirable. However, the over-emphasis made on controlling it had negative, short term effects. It also implied a loss of resources for the national government. Finally, it almost meant the disappearance of a shock absorber in the economic activity, role that the Central Bank had played for several decades. In our opinion, this last consequence has been the result of an excessive interpretation from the board members on what the Central Bank's target should be. The importance given to reducing inflation, rather than the short term smoothing of the economic business cycle, has been almost entirely a decision made by the board members, and not so much a constitutional mandate.
In order to evaluate the relative importance of different phenomenon, economists use an analytical exercise which considers "contra- Summing up, we would not have lived in quite a different country from the one we are used to, but we could have spared the expenditure madness, bubble, implosion, recession, poverty that Colombia has experienced since 1997.
How should Colombia handle an eventual new oil boom? We believe that the only way is to pass a law, before any important discoveries are made. This is the only way a pillage policy can be avoided once a bounty treasure is at sight. The country's fiscal situation demands a serious definition of priorities in case a discovery is made. At the same time, the exchange rate effects, which had clear consequences during the previous decade, must be taken into account. Many countries have succumbed to the Dutch disease. Finally, the opposite scenario must also be contemplated promptly.
The outlook for oil and its fiscal impact
Oil prospects in oil-exporting countries have gained great relevance, with oil prices at this Other channels through which resources from the oil sector affect the public sector balance include tax revenue, royalties and contributions to the oil stabilization fund FAEP. In 2006, tax revenue from the oil sector came to nearly 1% of GDP, or just over 6% of total tax revenue.
Higher oil prices should also be reflected in higher royalties to the regions. But these hardly ever translate into higher fiscal balances for regional governments, as the funds are usually spent right away.
Fuel subsidies also affect fiscal results. The government continues to subsidize fuel prices. Until last year, Ecopetrol paid this subsidy directly, but this quasi-fiscal responsibility was removed, to free the company from such a close association with national fiscal accounts. The central government pays the subsidy now, though it is financed by an Ecopetrol transfer. The cost of Crude reserves according to scenario the subsidy is not really an expense for Ecopetrol; it simply represents the funds it didn't earn because fuel prices are not raised concurrently with oil price increases. Let us now look at the brightest scenario. Figure 3 shows the peaks in exploration since 1918, and relates it to the new reserves found. The figure is quite revealing in the sense that dramatic increases in exploration led to substantial findings. That was the case at the beginning of the 1940s, the end of 1950s, and the beginning and end of the 1980s. Figure 15 shows that currently Colombia is exhibiting one of those exploration peaks; hence, should future resemble the past, the country should be at the verge of a huge discovery.
If that were the case, the lessons from the nineties should be learned. Macroeconomically, the huge fiscal mess at the end of the nineties owes much to the mirages of "Saudi Colombia" created at the beginning of that decade. Huge oil discoveries, that added in less than a decade 3 billion barrels to total reserves, led to over-expending, over-borrowing, loosening of budget constraints for public and private sectors, overvaluation, housing and mortgage credit bubbles, In addition to Colombia's oil reserve potential, the country offers favorable conditions for private investment, both national and foreign. This should provide a basis for the increase in exploratory activity in its different phases, and create the conditions for the country to maintain its condition as an oil exporting nation.
Conclusions
Colombia has a history of regulatory changes that makes potential investors still unsure about the guarantee that they will be able to keep the fields until depletion, or that new conditions (taxes and government participation) would not be imposed above those agreed upon. Indeed, the unstable regulation of the nineties is a revealing and troubling signal that this could happen.
We attribute to the short lived oil boom an important share of the disastrous macroeconomic performance of the end of the nineties. The channels of transmission were basically the relaxation of the intertemporal budget constraints of government, firms and households.
How should Colombia handle an eventual new oil boom? We believe that the only way is to pass a law, before any important discoveries are made, defining the use of increased state resources. This is the only way a pillage policy can be avoided once a bounty treasure is at sight. The country's fiscal situation demands a serious definition of priorities in case a discovery is made. At the same time, the exchange rate effects, which had clear consequences during the previous decade, must be taken into account. Many countries have succumbed to the Dutch disease. Finally, the opposite scenario must also be contemplated promptly. 
